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Abstract—Smart grid provides fine-grained real time energy
consumption, and it is able to improve the efficiency of energy
management. It enables the collection of energy consumption data
from consumer and hence has raised serious privacy concerns.
Energy consumption data, a form of personal information that
reveals behavioral patterns can be used to identify electrical
appliances being used by the user through the electricity load
signature, thus making it possible to further reveal the residency
pattern of a consumer’s household or appliances usage habit.
This paper proposes to enhance the privacy of energy con-
sumption data by enabling the utility to retrieve the aggregated
spatial and temporal consumption without revealing individual
energy consumption. We use a lightweight cryptographic mech-
anism to mask the energy consumption data by adding random
noises to each energy reading and use Paillier’s additive homo-
morphic encryption to protect the noises. When summing up the
masked energy consumption data for both Spatial and Temporal
aggregation, the noises cancel out each other, hence resulting in
either the total sum of energy consumed in a neighbourhood at
a particular time, or the total sum of energy consumed by a
household in a day. No third party is able to derive the energy
consumption pattern of a household in real time. A proof-of-
concept was implemented to demonstrate the feasibility of the
system, and the results show that the system can be efficiently
deployed on a low-cost computing platform.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart grid is a two way communication electrical grid
that can link an array of energy sources [17]. It is capable
of recording fine-grained real time consumption data, and
handling bi-directional flow of energy, thus increasing the
efficiency of energy management. Energy consumption data
is usually aggregated by a concentrator, and then sent to
the utility for monthly electrical billing, energy distribution
automation, load monitoring and forecasting [5], [12]. With
this, the utility will have a better understanding in electrical
demand during daily peaks in order to keep up with the
uprising trend of electrical energy demand. This can help to
prevent insufficient allocation of electricity that could lead
to blackouts and power outage, and at the same time better
integrate the renewable energy into the energy grid.
The ability to collect energy consumption data from con-
sumer in real time has raised serious privacy concerns. En-
ergy consumption data can be seen as a form of personal
information that reveals behavioral patterns and it can be
used to identify electrical appliances [17], [6] being used in
a household. A number of research studies have shown that
through the analysis of electrical consumption data, we can
easily determine electrical events, identify electrical appliances
and eventually know how these appliances are been used [13],
[3], [19], [4]. Each electrical appliance has its unique load
signature, and through these consumption data, attackers are
able to visualize consumption behavior, such as the sleep and
wake habit in a consumer’s household. With a long period of
monitoring, it is possible to further reveal the residency pattern
of a consumer’s household or appliances usage habit. To a
certain extent, appliance load monitoring can be misused by
attackers to forecast a consumer’s household activities, posing
possible risks and threats to consumers.
On the other hand, the energy data is useful for marketing
purposes. Many industries use these data to profile their users,
identify potential customers as part of their marketing strategy.
The problem is further exacerbated by the fact that smart
grid is not protected against eavesdropping, making it possible
for the public or a third party to get hold of these personal
information [2], [3], [22].
This paper proposes a lightweight cryptographic mecha-
nism to mask the energy consumption data by adding random
noises to each energy consumption data before it is transmitted
to the utility. When summing up the masked energy consump-
tion data for both Spatial and Temporal aggregation, the noises
cancel out each other, hence resulting in either the total sum
of energy consumed in a neighbourhood at a particular time,
or the total sum of energy consumed by a household in a day.
We further protect the leakage of individual random noise by
using homomorphic encryption such that the utility only has
access to the sum of all random noises in order to derive the
actual energy consumed. Hence, no third party is able to derive
the energy consumption pattern of a household in real time.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews
the literature and related work. Section III describes a smart
grid use case and requirements to preserve the user’s privacy.
Section IV presents the proposed lightweight Spatial and
Temporal data aggregation scheme. In Section V, we present
the implementation details, while Section VI describes the
evaluation results. Finally, we present an informal security
analysis in Section VII and conclude the paper with future
work in Section VIII.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
There are various privacy enhancing techniques to protect
the user’s privacy in smart grid [20], and we briefly describe
them in this section.
A. Obfuscating
Obfuscating energy consumption can be done using al-
ternative energy sources [11], or if there’s a energy storage
through flattening or reshaping strategies . Flattening energy
consumption requires a rechargeable battery that will charge
and discharge to modify the energy consumption at strategic
timing. The purpose is to prevent the identification of electrical
events or usage patterns of electrical appliances from the
energy consumption. Energy consumption will be modified to a
constant flat energy consumption. The rechargeable battery can
choose to charge or discharge for each level in net demand [7].
Reshaping of energy consumption can be used to hide
characteristics of electrical appliances. It modifies the energy
consumption such that appliances load signature cannot be
easily discerned. Similar to flattening of energy consumption,
this method requires a rechargeable battery or other power gen-
eration devices to be used. There are three different reshaping
strategies, namely (1) Hiding, it will provide all the required
energy from the battery and recharged later. (2) Obfuscating,
it will provide all the required energy from the battery but
the battery will recharge itself at different short interval. (3)
Smoothing, it will use part of the required energy from the
battery while the smart grid will provide the remaining energy
required [14]. However, these techniques have its limitations
and drawbacks. Flattening of energy consumption is limited by
the maximum charging and discharging rate of the recharge-
able battery or the capacity of the battery [7]. The cost for this
implementation is very high, furthermore rechargeable battery
requires maintenance and have a limited lifetime [14].
B. Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption allows aggregation of encrypted
energy consumption data without the need of decrypting
them [21], [9], [10]. In a simpler term, energy consumption
data from the smart meters are first encrypted using homo-
morphic encryption, when they reach the concentrator, the
total sum of the energy consumption is computed through
the aggregation of the encrypted readings, in which addition
is performed over encrypted data. When the aggregated data
is decrypted by the utility, it would be the total sum of
energy consumption. The purpose is to allow utility to retrieve
aggregation of the energy consumption for the necessary tasks,
such as billing and load monitoring, without revealing the
original energy consumption data.
Garcia and Jacobs [8] proposed to integrate secret shar-
ing and homomorphic encryption for smart metering. They
proposed that every smart meter picks a random amount of
smart meters and prepares a share of its own measurement
with each selected smart meter. Among all the shares, one of
the shares is to be kept locally and the other shares will be
encrypted with the public key of the smart meters involved. A
substation connected to the smart meters will then collect all
encrypted shares and multiply the encrypted shares that belong
to the same smart meter recipient before sending the results
to the smart meter. The smart meter will decrypt the results
and adds the locally stored share to the decrypted results. The
substation will collect all aggregated results and sum them
up to compute the total energy consumption. The proposed
approach can provide confidentiality to all the consumption
from the smart meter, however, the smart meter would have to
transfer data four times before the substation can receive the
total energy consumption, which makes the proposed approach
inefficient and incurs additional communication overheads.
C. Masking
Kursawe et al. [16] proposed to mask energy consumption
with secret sharing. In a group of the smart meters, one will be
elected as the leader. Before sending the energy consumption,
all smart meters, except the leader, will generate a random
secret. The random secret will be encrypted and sent to the
leader. The leader will then compute its secret using all
random secrets from the smart meters, so that the sum of
all the secrets will become zero. The smart meters will mask
the energy consumption using the secret and send it to the
aggregator. The aggregator will sum up all the masked energy
consumption to retrieve the aggregated energy consumption
from all smart meters. The secrets will cancel out each other
during the summing process. This scheme requires all smart
meters, except for the leader, to transfer data at least twice to
send out the energy consumption. In addition, the scheme is
an expensive protocol due to the requirement of exchanging a
new Diffie Hellman public key among all the smart meters for
every transmission.
III. SMART GRID USE CASE AND REQUIREMENTS
In a typical deployment, a smart meter is installed in each
household to measure energy use of electrical appliances at
home. Within a neighborhood, e.g., a HDB Block in Singapore,
or a residential area, a wireless mesh network is set up
to interconnect all the smart meters from each home to a
concentrator, so that the collected energy usage data can be
aggregated before they are forwarded to the Network Operating
Centre (called a Head-end) through a WAN interface. The
smart meter from every household then periodically reports
energy usage to a concentrator, which subsequently aggregate
the data in order to minimize bandwidth consumption and to
reduce the number of messages to be transmitted, therefore
improving efficiency. The aggregated data are then forwarded
to the utility data management center for billing and analysis.
Fig. 1. Spatial and Temporal Aggregation of Energy Consumption
In this setting, we are interested in achieving two goals,
namely (1) The utility has an overview of the energy consump-
tion of each neighbourhood on an hourly basis so that energy
distribution and planning can be achieved more accurately.
However, the utility should not have any knowledge of the
energy consumed by an individual household hourly. (2) The
utility is able to obtain a 24-hour energy consumption of each
household, so that billing can be done accurately. As illustrated
in Figure 1, the first goal is known as Spatial Aggregation,
it allows the utility to know the total energy consumption a
group of consumers in a neighbourhood has used at a fixed
time. Utility uses these data to adjust the energy distribution
to different groups of consumers. Countries with renewable
energy can use these data to balance out the usage of renewable
energy and non-renewable energy, which are more expensive
and less environment friendly. While Temporal Aggregation
allows the utility to know the total energy consumption a
consumer has used for a fixed period of time, and uses these
data for billing purposes.
IV. A LIGHTWEIGHT PRIVACY-PRESERVED SPATIAL AND
TEMPORAL DATA AGGREGATION
Fig. 2. Overview of the privacy-preserved data aggregation
We propose a security protocol to commission a privacy-
preserved smart metering infrastructure and to protect the
user’s privacy based on additive data masking [16] and ho-
momorphic encryption [18]. As shown in Figure 2, the idea is
similar to adding a random noise to each energy usage data
reported by the smart meter. Each smart meter generates a
random noise matrix with a special property that the sum all
elements in a row is equivalent to zero. Each random noise in
the matrix is for one time use only. The smart meter reports
energy data periodically, by first adding a random noise to
mask the energy reading, by computing C. At the same time,
the random noise is encrypted using homomorphic scheme,
i.e., Noise, and this allows the concentrator to perform addi-
tive homomorphic encryption on all the Noises to compute
Nspatial at a given time interval.
For Spatial Aggregation, the utility upon receiving all the
masked readings (C1, ..., Cm) from the smart meters at a
given time interval, sums them up and deducts the decrypted
sum of the random noises produced by the concentrator,
(DecryptPrivH (Nspatial)), thus knowing the energy load in
the neighbourhood in real time. As for Temporal Aggregation,
all the readings from a household (C1,1, ..., C1,24) are summed
up at the end of the day to obtain the total energy consumed for
the day. When summing up the energy data, the noises added
by smart meters will cancel out each other, thus summing up to
zero (0), enabling the utility to obtain the aggregated Temporal
readings.
A. Commissioning and System Setup
Prior to deployment, while commissioning the smart meter-
ing infrastructure, it is assumed that each smart meter is config-
ured and provisioned with a secret-key, Ksm. This secret-key
is unique to each smart meter and is shared with the utility.
This secret-key is used for identification purpose, allowing
the utility to identify each household uniquely. Additionally,
Paillier homomorphic cryptosystem [18] is set up such that a
keypair is generated and the public-key, PubH is distributed
to all smart meters, while the PrivH is kept by the utility. The
concentrator is assumed to have no knowledge of the PrivH ,
and its main responsiblity is to perform data aggregation.
Each smart meter is responsible for generating a random
noise matrix to be used to mask the energy usage, and this
matrix should be kept secret by the smart meter itself in order
to prevent leakage. The following shows the random noise
matrix, Ri generated dynamically by each smart meter, where i
denotes the smart meter id. The row denotes the random noises
to be used to mask the energy data per day (Day 1, ..., n), while
the column denotes the time interval in a day (1, 2, 3, ..., 24)
assuming that the smart meter reports the energy consumption
on an hourly basis. Therefore, r1,1 is used on Day 1 at 0000
AM, r1,2 on Day 1 at 0100 AM, and so on and so forth. While
r2,1 is used on Day 2 at 0000 AM, etc. The random noise is
for one-time use, and a new random noise matrix is generated
once all the rows in Ri have been used up.
Ri =

r1,1 r1,2 r1,3 . . . r1,24
r2,1 r2,2 r2,3 . . . r2,24
...
...
...
. . .
...
rn,1 rn,2 rn,3 . . . rn,24

The property of this random noise matrix, Ri is that the
sum of each row and each column is zero respectively, i.e.,
sum of (r1,1, r1,2, ..., r1,24) is zero, and sum of (r1,1, r2,1, ...,
rn,1) is zero as well. R is generated column by column. Since
it is assumed that the energy consumption is to be reported
on an hourly basis, the first 23 columns are generated using
the procedure below and it is iterated for each column, i.e.,
23 iterations:
Step 1:
A random number matrix of N X N is first generated, where
N is the number of days.

p1,1 p1,2 . . . p1,n
p2,1 p2,2 . . . p2,n
...
...
. . .
...
pn,1 pn,2 . . . pn,n

Step 2:
To compute each element ri,p in R where p = 1, 2,... N and
i = 1, 2,... N where N is the number of days, Equation 1 is
used to generate all the random noises for column p, which
contains N random noises. The value β in Equation 1 is a
large number generated randomly.
ri,p = β +
∑
j=1
p(i,j→N) −
∑
j=1
p(j→N,i) (1)
Step 3:
At the end of the 23 iterations, the first 23 columns in R have
been computed, Equation 2 is used to compute the last column
of the random noise matrix. Thus completing the random noise
matrix generation.
ri,24 = β −
k=23∑
j=1
r(i,j→k) (2)
B. Operation: Energy Usage Reporting
1) Temporal Aggregation: As each smart meter has its own
Ri, it uses this random noise matrix to protect its privacy.
When reporting the energy data at each interval, say j, the
smart meter adds the corresponding noise to the energy data.
For example, on Day 1, the first row of random noise matrix
is used to mask the energy data. The message is formatted
as (Source | Timestamp | Masked Energy Data), and then
encrypted with its secret key, Ksm before it is sent to the
utility for processing and billing. The masked energy data,
Ck,j is computed by smart meter k at each hour j as follows:
C(k,j) = (energy + ri,j) mod β (3)
where j = 1, 2, ..., 24.
Subsequently, C(k,j) is encrypted using the secret key,
Ksm−k that is only known between the smart meter k and
the utility.
2) Spatial Aggregation: In order to facilitate Spatial Ag-
gregation of energy data, while reporting the energy reading,
each smart meter k also uses homomorphic encryption to
encrypt the random noise, ri,j it added to its energy reading
at each interval j, and then sends the encrypted noise to the
concentrator.
Noise(k) = EncryptPubH (ri,j mod β) (4)
where i = 1, 2, 3,..., n and j = 1, 2, ..., 24.
The concentrator then computes the sum of all the
Noise(k) received from all smart meters in a neighbourhood.
In the Paillier’s scheme, the summation of encrypted values
can be computed using the dot product of two encrypted
data, i.e., EncryptPubH (r1,1 + r1,2) = EncryptPubH (r1,1)· EncryptPubH (r1,1). This is also equivalent to (Noise1 ·
Noise2). In this way, the concentrator does not have access to
the value of the individual random noise, but it is able to sum
them up by performing the following:
Nspatial =
M∏
k=1
Noise(k) (5)
where M denotes number of smart meters
The encrypted sum of the noises from all smart meters
denoted as Nspatial at a time interval is sent to the utility.
C. Verification and Billing
1) Spatial Aggregation: With this scheme, in real time, the
utility is able to monitor the energy load of a neighbourhood
on an hourly basis through the data received from Spatial
Aggregation, which means that the utillity will receive all the
masked readings, C(k,j) from all smart meters, and Nspatial
from the concentrator. For each neighbourhood, the masked
readings are added up together, hence yielding the total sum of
masked consumption. As the utility has the private key of the
Pailler’s homomorphic encryption scheme, it is able to retrieve
the sum of all random noises at hour j by decrypting Nspatial.
SUMj = DecryptPrivH (Nspatial) (6)
In order to derive the total energy in a neighbourhood, the
utility deducts the total masked consumption with SUMj as
this would cancel out the random noises added by the smart
meters, thus leaving a multiple of β in the total sum of energy
consumption. The result must then be modulus by β in order
to retrieve the original total sum of energy consumption data.
In essense, the utility computes the sum of all masked energy
data from smart meter k where k = 1,2,..., M for hour j as
follows:
Spatial(j) =
k=M∑
k=1
C(k,j) − SUMj mod β (7)
2) Temporal Aggregation: The utility is also able to deter-
mine the total energy usage for a household by computing the
sum of all masked data recorded by a smart meter k in a day,
i.e., 24 hours. With that, the utility is able to correctly bill the
customer, without the ability to know the enegy consumption
of a particular household on an hourly basis.
Temporal(k) =
j=24∑
j=1
C(k,j) mod β (8)
3) Cross-check and Verification: It is important to ensure
that the random noises used for all the smart meters have not
been tampered with or modified in a malicious manner. As
each row of random noises in the matrix sums up to zero, the
summation of all random noises of M smart meters must yield
zero as well. A verification can be performed by the utility to
ensure the following:
j=24∑
j=1
SUMj mod β = 0 (9)
D. Renewal of Random Noise Matrix, Ri
As the random noise matrix is generated by the smart
meter itself, whenever all the random noises have been used
up, a new random noise matrix should be generated using the
method and procedures as described in Section IV-A.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
A proof-of-concept (PoC) had been implemented to
demonstrate the feasiblity of the proposed lightweight privacy-
preserved spatial and temporal data aggregation. A typical
smart meter does not have high computing power or flash
memory. Thus, we developed our PoC on a Raspberry Pi
Model B, in order to simulate the smart meter. Raspberry Pi is
a low-end computer with low computing capability, allowing
this prototype to have the closest test results when deploying
the application. Similarly, we employed a Raspberry Pi as the
concentrator.
The module for generating the random noise matrix was
implemented in Java, and the communication between the
smart meters and the concentrator was via ethernet, other
communication means such as Zigbee, Wi-Fi, IEEE 802.15.4
should be used in the real deployment. Energy data are
sent using UDP, and we implemented a simple reliable UDP
protocol to ensure that the energy consumption data is sent
and received using request-reply-ack protocol.
As for the communication between the concentrator and
the utility. A TCP connection was established between them.
This communication channel could optionally be secured using
Transport Layer Security (TLS). However, in this prototype,
since the masked energy data is encrypted, it is not necessary
to deploy TLS. Encryption of masked energy consumption data
was based on AES with a key length of 128-bit.
As for the Paillier Homomorphic Encryption scheme, we
plan to integrate the existing implementation provided in [15]
with the proposed energy masking scheme. A homomorphic
encryption keypair can be generated by computing n = pq and
λ = lcm(p−1, q−1) where two large prime numbers, p and q
are choosen randomly and independently from each other such
that gcd(pq, (p−1)(q−1) = 1. A random integer g is generated
where g ∈ Z∗n2 , and hence the public-key is derived as (n, g)
and the private-key is (λ, µ) where µ = (L(gλ mod n2))−1
mod n, and function L is defined as L(u) = u−1n .
Additive homomorphic encryption is performed (on both
the smart meter and the concentrator) by first selecting a
random number r ∈ Z∗n and computing the ciphertext, c as
follows:
c = gm · rn mod n2 (10)
Decryption is done (at the utility) to compute the plaintext as
follows:
m = L(cλ mod n2) · µ mod n (11)
VI. EVALUATION AND RESULTS
This section discusses the evaluation of the system devel-
oped as well as the performance of the protocol.
To ensure that the developed system does not excessively
overload the smart meter, we monitored the CPU usage and
memory consumption on the Raspberry PI for generating the
random noise matrices. Table I shows the usage of CPU for
both the smart meter and the concentrator on a Raspberry Pi.
Memory CPU
Energy reporting on a smart meter 2.8% 60 - 70%
Random Noise Matrix Generation 3.3% 80 - 90%
TABLE I. USAGE OF CPU AND RAM ON RASPBERRY PI
While performing the energy data masking (excludes the
homomorphic encryption operation), the memory usage in
smart meter is approximately 2.8%, while the memory usage
for generating the random noise matrix is 3.3%. The values
in the table are the mean average results from a series of
monitoring while the application was running. However, the
CPU usage for the process of generating random noise matrix
on each smart meter seems to be rather high, using 80 to 90%
of the CPU most of the time.
Number of rows in Ri Time No of random noises per row
2 130 ms 24
25 1206 ms 24
50 2638 ms 24
50 6197 ms 30
TABLE II. TIME TAKEN TO COMPUTE RANDOM NOISE MATRIX WITH
DIFFERENT NUMBER OF SMART METERS
The time taken to generate the random noise matrix with
varing dimensions is shown in Table II. When generating the
random noise matrix for two days consumption (i.e., 2 rows),
the system took 130 ms. However, when the number of rows is
increased to 25, the time taken to generate the noise increased
to approximately 1200 ms. The time taken would be further
increased when there were 50 rows.
VII. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
A. Privacy Protection
From a smart grid perspective, it is the consumers’ require-
ment to protect their own privacy from the utility provider,
hence it is difficult to persuade the utility provider to deploy a
privacy-enhanced security protocol in this context. Addition-
ally, the utlity provider is reluctant to use privacy-enhanced
technologies as it reduces the data that can be collected to
profile their customers for marketing purposes.
As a result, the best place to deploy privacy-enhanced
technology is at the smart meter itself where it is located at
the consumer domain. Since the consumers would like their
energy readings to be protected, they can exploit the proposed
system to generate the random noise matrix locally on the
smart meter. This ensures that no other entities in the smart
grid infrastructure have knowledge of the random noises added
to the energy readings reported periodically. The concentrator
only has access to the encrypted random noises and performs
homomorphic operations on the encrypted noises. The utility
only has access to the sum of the random noises from all smart
meters at a particular time interval, and it would be difficult
to derive the individual value of each random noise.
B. Protection of Random Noises
The privacy of energy reading is protected through masking
using a random noise. The random noise is then protected
using homomorphic encryption, so that only the sum of the
random noises can be computed and then deducted by the
utility to derive Spatial energy data. One can argue that there
is a leak of information in that the sum of random noises is
known to the utility, however we argue that as the noise added
to the energy reading is random, the sum of these noises is
considered as a random number that is unpredictable to the
utility as well.
The reason that homomorphic encryption was used to
protect the random noises instead of the energy readings is
because we can use the masking scheme to obsfucate energy
data both Spatially and Temporally in which case it requires
less computation. As compared to the scheme where only
homomorphic encryption is used to protect spatial aggregation
and temporal aggregation of energy data, it would incur a lot of
multiplication operations of encrypted data on the concentrator,
if not the smart meters.
C. Homomorphic Operation on the Concentrator
The current architecture requires that the additive homo-
morphic encryption of random noises is performed by the
concentrator with the assumption that it does not have the
knowledge of the homomorphic private key. As the concen-
trator device belongs to the utility provider, it is possible
that the utility provider may deploy its private-key onto the
concentrator so that it is able to decrypt the individual noise.
A mitigation plan is only allows the smart meters to
perform the additive homomorphic encryption operation by
relaying the encrypted noise from one smart meter to another
without involving the concentrator. In this way, the random
noises generated by each smart meter will only be known to
itself.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
This paper proposed a lightweight privacy-preserved aggre-
gation of energy usage data using a combination of masking
method and homomorphic encryption in order to allow for Spa-
tial and Temporal aggregation. We have developed the masking
technique based on random noises that allows utility to retrieve
aggregated spatial consumption for monitoring purposes as
well as aggregated temporal consumption for billing purposes
while hiding individual energy consumption from any parties.
The benefits of the proposed system are mainly (1) enabling
the utility to accurately monitor the energy load of an area, e.g.,
a neighbourhood in real time, although it has no knowledge
of the energy load of each individual household. (2) enabling
the utility to correctly bill its customers, such that the system
can accurately report the total sum of energy consumption of
a household for a day, without revealing the electricity load
signatures. Through our PoC, the commissioning process and
the generation of random noise matrix Ri as well as the data
masking process is sufficiently lightweight to be deployed.
The next step is to further integrate the Paillier’s homomor-
phic implementation to protect the random noises especially
for Spatial Aggregation. Furthermore, we would like to further
evaluate our privacy protection protocol using the real energy
load dataset available from the Singapore Energy Market
Authority (EMA) [1]. It provides half-hourly system demand
data and this will enable us to further evaluate our system.
Having a large β while performing the masking is extremely
important and the system must be able to pick an appropriate
value for β in this case.
Other fault tolereance and reliable communicaiton issues
should be investigated further as whenever a smart meter fails
to report its energy usage data to the utility, the total of the
masked energy data will not sum up to zero, and hence intro-
ducing discrepancies in the energy consumption data. This has
to be dealt with carefully in order to prevent the attackers from
attempting to cripple the smart grid infrastructure. Mechanisms
to recover from failures and data logging could be introduced
to mitigate these issues.
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